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Abstract. Nuclear safeguards are from the very origin of the Joint Research Centre (JRC), and as 
enshrined in the EURATOM Treaty, a key duty of the European Commission and a field in which JRC has 
a fully unique position in Europe. In this area JRC is an un-replaceable R&D partner of Euratom safeguards 
authority and IAEA through its very extensive support programme. The JRC R&D safeguards programme 
aims in one hand at maintaining traditional safeguards at level so that deterrence to diversion from civil 
cycle remains high, taking into account that more installations will need to be safeguarded by EU and 
international authorities. This relies on development of advanced NDA, DA and CS techniques, full remote 
and unattended (authenticated) technology and stringent quality systems in measurements and results 
delivery. In another hand the RD programme put more focus on material flows in sensitive uranium and 
spent fuel handling facilities and use of fingerprinting techniques to cover diversion scenarios and more 
performing and accurate environmental sampling techniques and traces analysis. Open-source analysis and 
development of new tools and methodologies for the control of Import/export are areas where the effort is 
also increased.  In the JRC R&D programme a special attention is also given to the development of 
accountancy and safeguards concepts for advanced fuel cycles (GenIV) as well as proliferation resistance 
methodology. This scientific/technical work is encompassed by appropriate training activities. This paper is 
about some of the new R&D and innovation activities of the JRC as part of the EU contribution to the 
implementation of effective nuclear safeguards inside and outside the EU. 
1. Introduction 
 
Nuclear Safeguards, as any other treaty monitoring activity, depends highly on technological development. 
Indeed, there must be a constant evolution and improvement of the tools and methods used to be able to 
“stay ahead of the game”.  
 
There is a close link between technology and the implementation of Safeguards. Indeed, the state of the art 
in technology can determine the approach to safeguarding an installation. Vice-versa, the perception of 
gaps, be the experienced or merely theoretical, can provide guidelines for further research and technological 
development. 
 
From a technical point of view, Nuclear Safeguards is mostly an area of integration, combining at a single 
moment, the best tools and techniques available. The evaluation of new techniques is mainly based on 
criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, and cost. 
 
Efforts to improve Nuclear Safeguards can go along different lines, including: 
a) Better instruments, leading to better measurements with improved accuracy and less dispersion. 
b) Better process models – including new signal processing techniques 
c) Data Fusion – combining data from multiple sensors, measurements and time frames 
d) New technologies 
e) Integration and presentation of information – leading to better responsiveness, timeliness and more 
intuitive situation awareness 
 




Energy Community for nuclear research and training activities.  The current programme is the seventh 
(FP7) covering the period 2007-2011-2013 [1]. An important activity of the programme aims at 
contribution to the development of efficient and effective systems for the safeguards and proliferation 
resistance of current and future nuclear fuel cycle systems [2]. This implies tackling R&D challenges in the 
areas of nuclear materials measurements, containment and surveillance, information technology and process 
monitoring and modelling. These activities are performed in close collaboration with Euratom and IAEA 
safeguard inspectorates as main end users.   
Three JRC institutes contribute to the implementation of the nuclear safeguard part of the JRC Euratom 
program and thus actively collaborate with the IAEA within the framework of EC-SP. These are: 
- Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen (IPSC), Ispra, Italy 
- Institute for Reference Measurements and Materials (IRMM), Geel, Belgium 
- Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Karlsruhe, Germany 
The following sections detail some current and new research lines performed at JRC institutes, which may 
be of impact for future Safeguards related technologies and methods. 
2. Information Analysis for Non-Proliferation Studies 
The European Media Monitor (EMM) is a web-based application developed by JRC-IPSC which 
automatically collects and analyzes news articles from a pre-defined list of Open Sources ( 
http://emm.newsbrief.eu/overview.html). It currently monitors more than 2,500 news sites – with multi 
lingual, world wide coverage– in near-real-time and collects more than 100,000 new items each day. EMM 
automatically analyzes the full-text articles and groups them into thematic and geographic categories. EMM 
offers additional analysis tools to fight information overflow including e.g. detection of breaking news, 
entity extraction, duplicate detection and trend analysis. 
2.1 Nuclear Security Media Monitor (NSMM) 
Since the scope of the EMM Newsbrief is broad, it monitors mainly general news sites. Only few sites of 
specific nuclear interest are included and the category definitions are of general interest, making it difficult 
to locate nuclear specific news. 
Therefore, JRC-IPSC is currently considering the development of a Nuclear Security Media Monitor 
(NSMM): a domain specific version of EMM focusing on Nuclear Security issues. It uses the same 
underlying engine for collecting and analysing news articles, but it will be configured to better serve the 
needs of the Nuclear Security community.  
Over one hundred nuclear-specific sources have been already identified to be monitored by NSMM. In 
addition to nuclear-related news media, they also include governmental sites, NGOs, nuclear blogs or sites 
providing relevant scientific or technical information. By defining domain-specific categories, NSMM will 
allow monitoring specific issues relevant to the Nuclear Security community, such as e.g. illicit trafficking, 
export control violations, treaty violations or nuclear trade related events. 
A NSMM can provide a unique resource for early warning and information awareness customized to the 
needs of the Nuclear Security community. Applications are been investigated for the areas of (a) Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle - different phases, (b) Illicit trafficking of nuclear material and (c) Dual-use equipment. Once 
completed and in operation a NSMM will contribute to the need of more information driven safeguards 
verification activities.  
 
3. Development of New Reference Materials 
3.1 Age Dating Reference Particles 
Isotopic reference materials certified for the age of nuclear material (uranium, plutonium) are needed in the 
fields of nuclear forensics and environmental measurements; therefore a feasibility study for the 
development of plutonium reference materials for age dating has recently been started at JRC-IRMM in co-
operation with JRC-ITU. For the age estimation of a real sample, such as material seized in nuclear 
forensics investigations or a dust sample in environmental measurements, it is advisable to use more than 




question is a mixture of two or more materials. Consequently, a future reference material certified for 
separation date should ideally be certified for more than one "clock" or several reference materials for 
different "clocks" should be developed. [3] 
3.2 Uranium Oxyfluoride Reference Particles 
Recently improvements in the production and characterisation of uranium reference particles from certified 
UF6 reference materials mimicking the “real-life” process of uraniumoxyfluoride particles as observed in 
enrichment facilities and collected on swipes by safeguards inspectors. These certified test samples are used 
in interlaboratory comparisons (NUSIMEP) and as quality control samples. The improvement in particle 
production enables for the first time the preparation of planchets loaded with particles of different 235U 
enrichment. Also new approaches in micro-Raman spectrometry (MRS) to investigate the molecular form 
has been successfully applied giving possible indication on the source of origin .of uranium-bearing 
particles collected on swipes [4]. 
3.3 Reference Particles Certified for Isotopic Abundances And Uranium Amount Content 
It is a significant drawback for the Network of Analytical laboratories – NWAL, that mono-dispersed 
uranium reference particles, certified for isotopic abundances and uranium amount content per particle, are 
not available. These reference particles are needed to optimise the overall transmission efficiency in 
Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometer (SIMS) analysis. JRC-IRMM in cooperation with JRC-ITU took up the 
challenge to investigate new approaches in the development of a uranium particle reference material 
certified at the 2.6pg U per single particle. This requires thinking out of the box for isotope dilution mass 
spectrometry to achieve this goal. It is important since new large geometry SIMS instruments will be 
installed at JRC-ITU and at the IAEA-SGAS providing high quality and reliability with fast analysis 
increasing timeliness when safeguarding an enrichment facility. Particularly to enable the precise analysis 
of the 236U/238U ratio in particles from swipe samples, since 236U is an important environmental and 
nuclear trace but often with abundance close to the detection limit. Precise 236U analysis is presently not 
possible with current SIMS techniques. 
 
4. Large Geometry Secondary Ion Mass Spectroscopy – LG-SIMS 
 
JRC-ITU is currently in the process of acquiring a Large Geometry Secondary Ion Mass Spectroscopy 
instrument – LG-SIMS. This instrument is the very same as the one that the IAEA will have in a near future 
as part of the new SAL laboratories.  
The performance of LG-SIMS has been demonstrated to have a significantly better overall performance in 
uranium particle analysis compared to current Small Geometry SG-SIMS, due to the removal of 
background interferences without loss in the useful yield. Use of a multi ion counting system that currently 
is available for LG -SIMS can improve the counting statistics in the measurements approximately 5-fold. 
This reduces the uncertainties in the measurements and is an additional advantage for the LG-SIMS as the 
amount of material in uranium particles from swipe samples often are on the very borderline of what can be 
analysed. Thus, it should be possible to analyse smaller sized particles in the samples with LG-SIMS than is 
currently possible.  
It is concluded [5] that the use of an LG-SIMS offers particular advantages in the speed and thoroughness 
of analysis for this particular application. First, a larger number of particles can be deposited per planchet as 
it is no longer critical to avoid the sputtering of material surrounding the uranium particles, which is a 
necessity in SG-SIMS measurements. Normal sample loadings for routine analysis with conventional SG-
SIMS are a few million particles per planchet whereas the LG-SIMS is able to handle at least an order of 
magnitude more material. This significantly improves the ability to detect a uranium particle in a matrix of 
other material. Another consequence of the background removal is that it simplifies the search for uranium 
particles, as it is easier to spot the particles of interest thus improving timeliness. The multi ion counting 
system can also be operated for multi isotope imaging offering the possibility to make faster screening 
measurements with new dedicated particle search software that is under development.  
The LG-SIMS offers advantages with regard to the FT-TIMS analysis process as well. Sample preparation 
can take mere minutes and does not require a reactor offering quick sample turn-a-round and same-day 




LG-SIMS can quickly locate particles in a matrix, and can both provide high precision isotopic 
measurements and survey the isotopic distribution of thousands of particles within a sample.  
The main limitation in LG-SIMS measurements compared to TIMS is in the 236U measurements due to the 
necessity for a hydrogen correction. It has also been demonstrated that while mass bias and fractionation 
effects must be compensated for, they are a small component of the total uncertainty compared to the effect 
of the counting statistics on pg to sub-pg amounts of material available in real sample particles.  
 
5. Developments in Mass Spectrometry Techniques 
The so-called "modified total evaporation technique" in thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) has 
been developed in collaboration with "key nuclear safeguards laboratories" (NBL, IAEA/SGAS, ITU) with 
IRMM taking the initiative and the leading role. This method improved the capabilities and sample 
throughput in particular for measurements of the minor uranium isotope ratios. It has just recently been 













U minor ratios, within the same measurement, with improved precision and 









U) is shown in Fig. 1. It is well below the performance limit for the entire 
range of ratios as required by the IAEA . The excellent performance of this technique was demonstrated and 
will be officially accepted for safeguards measurements at the IAEA SGAS since the minor uranium ratios 
are measured in almost all of the environmental samples at the IAEA-SGAS and the IAEA Network of 
Analytical Laboratories.  
 










This method is also particularly suitable to “access” information that is inherent in uranium minor isotopes 
results from the viewpoint of nuclear forensics. Minor isotope measurements in uranium samples help in 
source attribution and are an important part of „nuclear fingerprinting‟ of discovered, unknown material. 
Furthermore, relations between materials can be established by means of minor isotope measurements in 
uranium samples. 
 
6. Development of Safeguards Concepts for Advanced Nuclear Cycles 
JRC-ITU is pursuing a substantial research programme devoted to the partitioning and transmutation (P&T) 
of spent fuels. This includes both investigations on advanced processes for improved actinide and fission 
product separation, and the development of special fuels for transmutation. Among the different approaches 
for partitioning, major efforts are being directed towards the development and testing of pyrochemical 
reprocessing techniques. For this purpose dedicated test facilities for studying pyro-reprocessing with non-




This work will also focus on the development of safeguards concepts for advanced fuel cycles. Apart from 
process development, the test facilities will serve the purpose of building measurement schemes to fulfil 
safeguards objectives. 
The ongoing research work on the pyro-reprocessing technology requires continuous analytical support for 
(timely) analysis of the various process samples in order to verify and to assess the quality and efficiency of 
the respective separation processes. Over the years some of this analytical support, especially for minor 
actinide analysis, has been also provided by various radiometric techniques as far as they appeared 
applicable. The radiometric techniques used for this purpose at JRC-ITU included mainly X-ray 
fluorescence analysis (XRF), high-resolution gamma spectrometry (HRGS), passive neutron coincidence 
counting (PNCC), and occasionally also calorimetry. The measurements were made with instrumentations 
coupled to gloveboxes, which allow the handling of non-irradiated nuclear materials. The analytical support 
with the radiometric techniques was therefore possible as long as the investigations for pyro-reprocessing 
were conducted with these types of materials [6]. 
Meanwhile the research work at JRC-ITU on the pyro-reprocessing techniques is proceeding to 
experimental studies, which also include actual irradiated nuclear fuels. In order to be able to provide 
further analytical support for this new type of highly radioactive process specimens, the measurement 
environment for the radiometric analysis techniques needed to be adapted accordingly. This has led to the 
conception and practical realization of a versatile NDA measurement station for the analysis of irradiated 
fuel samples.  
 
7. Infield Tools for the “Investigative Inspector”  
One of the objectives of the IAEA is to “deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons, by detecting early the 
misuse of nuclear material or technology, and by providing credible assurances that States are honouring 
their safeguards obligations”. In recent years the Safeguards approach has included the verification of state 
of the completeness of State declarations. To this effect, the Additional Protocol introduced a new family of 
legal instruments and modalities towards that objective. Unannounced inspections are one of such 
instruments, which will likely lead to changes in the way Safeguards inspectors operate. Monitoring for 
undeclared activities includes checking predictable compliance criteria as well as coping with unexpected 
scenarios. For the latter, the provision of in-field information to support the inspection is of paramount 
importance – as not all scenarios can be studied at Headquarters while preparing an unannounced 
inspection. To be useful, the information to be provided to the inspector must relate to the field context and 
must be comprehensive in content. The R&D activities are rooted mainly in the field of machine 
intelligence including: virtual reality, human-computer interactions involving augmented reality and 
information integration for improved situation awareness. 
The scope of this activity is to investigate tools, components and system architectures to be used by a 
Safeguards inspector to enhance her/his observation and “investigative” skills as well as securely retrieves 
local, just-in-time information while performing a complementary access inspection. The scientific 
disciplines supporting this project include augmented and mixed reality, ambient intelligence, and 
environment localisation as well as secure communications.  
As an example of the current work, the project will implement and demonstrate a prototype system of a 
multifunctional handheld device equipped with positioning sensors and a combined real-time 2D/3D data 
capture to assist an Inspector in performing a complementary access inspection. The Inspector will be able 
to interact with the device and have additional information, such as description of physical objects and 
instruction for performing physical tasks in form of annotation, off-the-shelf synthesizer-based speech 
instruction, image, and 3D model. Such prototype will illustrate the potential of the new tools assisting an 
inspector.  A possible goal includes the incorporation into one handheld piece of equipment diversified data 
gathering (e.g. radiation, thermal, spatial, chemical, environmental, distance measurements) and analysis 
capabilities. 
 
8. Real-time Simulation of Neutron Counters  




instruments used in nuclear safeguards. Physical models of most neutron devices have been also generated 
and validated. The simulation technique has become a valid and valuable tool to replace measurement every 
time the experiment is impossible (for instance due to lack of reference materials) or simply too 
cumbersome.  
The main complication in the calibration procedure of NDA techniques derives from the extremely high 
sensitivity of these measurements to a lot of parameters: geometry (shape and dimension), 
chemical/physical form, container, impurities. An accurate calibration procedure requires a set of standards 
being as similar as possible to the samples to be measured. Due to the high number of (sometime costly) 
reference materials required by NDA techniques, it becomes fundamental to investigate and develop 
methodologies giving the possibility to reduce these requirements. This task can be performed by numerical 
simulation. This research work aims at a full automated and real-time coupling of numerical simulation to 
NDA measurements. 
There are real cases where it is not possible to build at all a calibration curve, intended as a unique 
relationship between sample mass and counting rate. This means that a dedicated Monte Carlo run needs to 
be performed once the measurement configuration of the item is known. In order to help the inspector in 
this task, JRC is developing user interfaces allowing the inspector to create an input file for the Monte Carlo 
code for the declared loading fuel configuration. Initially a base input file of the model containing details of 
the detector geometry and its materials and other necessary information is pre-loaded and the inspector may 
need only to change the loading positions, the fuel type and isotopic composition.  
Nevertheless the long computing times required today to simulate the measurements allow just an “a 
posteriori” verification of the measurement. An ideal system should work on real time, that means: 
- receive the declaration on the sample characteristics together with the sample to be physically 
measured 
- process the information in order to produce automatically an input file for the simulation code 
- launch the calculation in parallel with the measurement 
- compare the simulation results with the measured data immediately in order to have an 
instantaneous answer on the correctness of the sample declaration 
The way we envisage real-time simulation of neutron counters impacts the usual way of using NDA 
measurements to verify nuclear material and requires a mentality change of inspector perspective. It is not 
simply the fact that we introduce a physical modelling as integral part of the experimental process, but also 
the change in the verification paradigm that compares no longer declared to measured mass, but expected to 
measured count rates.  
9. Combined CAlorimetry-NEutron coincidence counting- GAmma spectrometry (CANEGA) 
 
In the international safeguarding of nuclear materials the prime nondestructive assay (NDA) technique 
currently employed for plutonium measurements is neutron coincidence counting, combined with gamma 
spectrometry. One limitation of this kind of plutonium assay arises from the fact that the abundance of the 
isotope 
242
Pu cannot be determined by gamma spectrometry because of the absence of a detectable gamma-
ray signature from this isotope. This deficiency starts to limit the accuracy of the plutonium assay 
particularly for higher burn-up materials, where 
242
Pu contributes 25 % or more to the measured neutron 
coincidence rate. In this situation recourse is therefore often made to isotope correlations in order to obtain 
a rough estimate for the 
242
Pu isotope abundance. The proposed isotope correlations work reasonably well 
only for defined categories of plutonium materials of known burnup history. However, this information is in 
practice not readily available for the materials to be assayed, leaving therefore often relatively large 
uncertainties for the estimated 
242
Pu abundances. This uncertainty normally affects the performance both of 
the plutonium isotope abundance measurements and of the quantitative determination of the amount of 
plutonium. The use of a combined Calorimetry-Neutron Coincidence Counting-Gamma Spectrometry 
(CANEGA) assay can improve this unsatisfactory situation, The combination of the six directly measurable 
quantities as obtained from the three measurement techniques, namely the thermal power P from 
calorimetry, the effective mass m240eff of 
240
Pu from neutron coincidence counting (NCC), and the 
plutonium isotope ratios 238/239, 240/239 and 241/239 and 
241
Am/239 from high-resolution gamma 
spectrometry (HRGS) allow to determine the 
242
Pu isotope abundance, which otherwise cannot be directly 




complete fingerprint for any plutonium-bearing sample under assay, which in turn helps to improve the 
overall accuracy of the plutonium mass determination.  
The redundant information from combined CAL/NCC measurements has also proved to be extremely 
helpful for the plutonium assay in plutonium materials bearing the risk of a potential contamination with 
244
Cm.. The presence of small amounts of 
244
Cm in plutonium can quickly invalidate a plutonium assay by 
NCC as shown in Fig. 7 because of the very high specific emission rate of spontaneous fission neutrons 
from 
244
Cm, which exceeds the neutron emission rate from plutonium isotopes by about 4 orders of 
magnitude. The significantly lower sensitivity of a calorimetric assay to this isotope provides a good means 
of control for the NCC measurements. Combined CAL/NCC/HRGS measurements will also offer NDA 
measurement capabilities for a number of special types of nuclear materials, where a single technique 
would not be able to give an adequate measurement answer.   
 
10. Development of Alternative Techniques for Neutron Detection  
 
Most of the current neutron detection systems used for nuclear safeguards and security are based on the 
He-3 technology. Unfortunately in the last years the market of He-3 has encountered huge problems in 
matching the offer and the demand. The need has grown significantly due to the increasing demand of 
instrumentation for security. This has caused from one side an exponential increase of price (up to a factor 
10) and on the other side a serious strategic problem of supply (some manufacturers are not able to assure 
the production of instruments). The scope of this work is to guarantee the availability of detection systems 
for nuclear safeguards and security, and hence the development of alternative detection systems based on 
technologies other than He-3. The main advantages of He-3 detectors are the very high efficiency and the 
nearly perfect discrimination from gamma signal that makes them ideal for security applications. He-3 is 
universally considered the “golden standard” for neutron detection. It will be very unlikely, if not totally 
impossible, to develop neutron detectors having overall characteristics better than He-3. 
The main neutron detection technologies that could in principle compete with He-3 are: 
- BF3 gas-filled proportional detectors 
- Boron-lined proportional detectors  
- Semiconductor neutron detectors 
- Scintillation neutron detectors, including: 
 liquid organic scintillators,  
 plastic scintillators,  
 neutron-sensitive scintillating glasses 
 neutron-sensitive scintillating fibres 
 neutron-sensitive fibres coated with scintillating material 
Boron fluoride is a poisonous gas and for this reason has not found frequently practical applications. 
Semiconductor crystals suffer from limitations in size that limit their detection efficiency; therefore they 
can find some niche application for small equipment. 
Boron-lined gas-filled proportional counters are probably the more practical short-term solution. They are 
already available in the market. Geometrically they are identical to He-3 counters, so they can simply 
replace the existing tubes without the need of reengineering the entire detection system. The only 
disadvantage is the relatively low detection efficiency; a boron-lined proportional counter has efficiency 
approximately 7-times lower than a He-3 counter of the same size. This could be acceptable in security, but 
is a strong limiting factor in safeguards. 
Scintillation neutron detectors could be a longer term alternative to He-3 with respect to boron-lined 
counters. Scintillation detectors need a totally different (and generally more sophisticated) electronics than 
proportional counters, but on the other hand the detector itself is generally very cheap. Scintillation 
detectors have another potential interest. They are also sensitive to gamma radiation. This can be an 
advantage or a problem. In some cases it opens the possibility to have a single all-in-one gamma/neutron 
detector under the necessary condition that it is feasible a high-performance discrimination of signal 
between the two radiation types. Moreover the poor resolution makes the photon detection uninteresting for 
isotopic measurements in safeguards. 




The Euratom and IAEA inspectors are the main end users of the safeguards tools and technologies and need 
to have the best related training. In addition the present evolution of implementation of international 
safeguards asks for developing new training activities. Euratom and IAEA relies on a constant support from 
the JRC on training for inspectors which includes facilities for the use of both technical instrumentation and 
nuclear material. The different institutes of the JRC are involved in different areas of training, according to 
their respective scientific technical competence. There are nowadays at Ispra yearly about sixteen weeks of 
NDA training courses offered to Euratom and IAEA inspectors. This set of courses was recently extended 
with courses on Complementary Access and Design Information Verification and the Advanced NDA 
techniques. At the -analytical Laboratories in ITU – Karlsruhe specialized courses on the use of some 
measurement instrumentation are organised upon request. Training of IAEA and EURATOM inspectors in 
environmental sampling procedures is provided at ITU. This training is based on the rich experience 
available at ITU from particle analysis. Training on quality control on measurements are provided by the 
Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements. 
12. Summary and Conclusions  
The paper highlighted some new areas of research inside the European Commission – Joint Research 
Centre. These areas are highly focused on possible needs of both the IAEA and the European Commission‟s 
DG-Energy (implementing the EURATOM Treaty). As scientific results start to materialise it becomes 
easier to build working prototypes aimed at demonstration purposes. The dissemination of these results and 
prototypes will be done using the established channels, and in particular the European Commission 
Cooperative Support Programme to the IAEA [9]. 
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